Human rights are the universal rights that every human being can enjoy. The United Nations defines human rights in the Charter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as follows: «Human rights are the inherent rights of all human beings without distinction as to race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion or other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, the right not to be subjected to slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and much more. Everyone has the right to these rights, without discrimination. Dworkin (1973, 1975, 1981, 1986) was a representative of the first point of view in a formulation of his legal theory. Consequently, rights have a categorical primacy over any other consideration that is not itself legally justified. Of course, it is true in many legal systems that constitutional rights, or some of them, should take precedence over any other consideration that does not itself flow from a constitutional right. But this seems to be mainly due to the constitutional status of the law. Both in law and morality, many rights are rather trivial. In morality, these rights can sometimes even be justified by considerations of personal comfort (cf. Raz 1978). Similarly, it appears in the legislation that many prima facie rights can be overridden by what the court considers to be public interest considerations. Dworkin`s (1977) response to the latter type of criticism was to argue that, on closer inspection, the examination of opposition to the law can itself be seen as instantiating another common law.

However, this depends on the controversial assertion that the only considerations on which the courts can legitimately rely are pre-existing rights. It was also objected that, as a general theory of the nature of rights, it might be self-destructive, since then any consideration could be considered to be based on law, which meant that rights did not have a particular role in practical argumentation. (For a discussion of Dworkin`s theory, including its other formulations, see Yowell 2007.) A fifth characteristic of rights concerns their importance when we invoke them. This is best understood when comparing legal claims to requests for charity or generosity. Regarding the latter: Sometimes we ask for things we don`t deserve. I want a luxury sports car. You have more than enough money to buy me one. I confront you and say: Could you buy me a Ferrari? Thus, one of the most important features of legal rights is that they are formulated by the state or government according to the desire of the majority for the common good of its citizens.

Therefore, they are not universal or timeless like human rights and moral rights. However, they affect every citizen of that particular state, whether the citizens are publicly aware that they exist or not. They appear in laws, constitutions, statutes, laws, etc. They can also change accordingly. Although Mills does not necessarily share the view that all rights are linked to the foundations of well-being, many contemporary writers (e.g. Raz, 1984a, 1984b; Wellman 1985, 1995) agree that the basic concept of a law is something common to law and morality, although some have argued that legal authors, particularly Hohfeld, provide a better and clearer starting point for general analysis than previous authors in moral philosophy. The view that the basic concept is common to both seems consistent with the assertion that legal claims concerning justification in practical reasoning should nevertheless be based on moral claims. Whenever we are faced with a moral dilemma, we must ask ourselves whether the action would respect the fundamental rights of each individual involved. How would the action affect the fundamental well-being of these people? How would the action affect the freedom of these people? Is it manipulation or deception? Actions are wrong to the extent that they violate the rights of the individual. In most European countries, it is not possible for authors to assign or even waive their moral rights. This follows a tradition of European copyright itself, which is considered property that cannot be sold, only under license. The author may agree to waive them to a limited extent (and such conditions are very common in contracts in Europe).

It may also be necessary for the author to «assert» these moral rights before they can be exercised. In many books, for example, this happens on a page at the beginning, in and between data from the British Library/Library of Congress. [13] As discussion of the relative merits of choice and utility theories has continued and increasingly sophisticated versions of the two have been proposed (see, for example, the tripartite debate in Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner 1998, Kramer 2010, Vrousalis 2010, Van Duffel 2012), some authors have tried to propose different or combined approaches. Wenar (2005) defends what he calls a theory of «multiple functions». Accordingly, any «Hohfeld incident» (or a combination thereof) that grants an exception, discretion or authorization, or that authorizes the owner to protect, provide or perform, is a right. However, Kramer and Steiner (2007) argue that this is really nothing more than another version of utility theory and is not superior to existing versions. Another suggestion comes from Sreenivasan (2005), which should apply only to claimed rights and not to other types of rights. The essence of this is that Y is entitled to claim that X performs an action if, and only if, Y`s level of control over X`s duty (intends) corresponds to the level of control that furthers Y`s interests as a whole. Kramer and Steiner (2007) also criticize this situation on the grounds that it would include the case where someone deliberately did not obtain such power on the basis of their own interests. However, this would lead to a very implausible widening of the circle of those who should be considered right holders. The powers also illustrate a general problem in the analysis of legal claims and arguably rights in general. Namely, whether an element is to be regarded as forming part of the essence of the concept of right or whether it is merely an element of what its content is (conditionally), that is to say, what a right exists or is to be obtained.

Philosophers distinguish between legal and moral rights. Legal rights are freedoms or protections that individuals have because some laws say so. For example, Americans eighteen years of age or older have the right to legally vote. For obvious reasons, legal rights do not arise by themselves; They must be created by law, whether (here are two possibilities) by the whims of a despot or by the will of a democratically elected assembly. Thus, a defining feature of legal rights is that they are man-made; As such, people can also cancel them. What is legal and what is moral is similar in many ways, but very different in others.